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ABSTRACT
We investigate the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners in elections
over incomplete voter preferences. In the case of the necessary winners, we show how to implement
and accelerate the polynomial-time algorithm of Xia and Conitzer. In the case of the possible winners,
where the problem is NP-hard, we give a natural reduction to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for
all positional scoring rules and implement it in a leading commercial optimization solver. Further,
we devise optimization techniques to minimize the number of ILP executions and, oftentimes, avoid
them altogether. We conduct a thorough experimental study that includes the construction of a rich
benchmark of election data based on real and synthetic data. Our findings suggest that, the worst-case
intractability of the possible winners notwithstanding, the algorithmic techniques presented here scale
well and can be used to compute the possible winners in realistic scenarios.
1 Introduction
The theory of social choice focuses on the question of how preferences of individuals can be aggregated in such
a way that the society arrives at a collective decision. It has been of interest throughout the history of humankind,
from the analysis of election manipulation by Pliny the Younger in Ancient Rome, to the 18th Century studies of
voting rules by Jean-Charles de Borda and Marquis de Condorcet, and the more recent ground-breaking work on
dictatorial vote aggregation by Kenneth Arrow in the 1950s. Over the past two decades, computational social choice
has been developing as an interdisciplinary area between social choice theory, economics, and computer science,
where the central topics of study are the computational and algorithmic perspectives of voting challenges such as vote
aggregation [1].
A voting rule determines how the collection of voter preferences over a set of candidates is mapped to the set of winning
candidates (the winners). Among the most extensively studied is the class of positional scoring rules, where every
candidate receives a score from every voter that is determined only by the position of the candidate in the voter’s
ranking. A candidate wins if she achieves the highest total score — the sum of scores it receives from each voter.
A particularly challenging computational aspect arises in situations in which voter preferences are only partial (i.e., they
can be modeled as partial orders). This might happen since, for example, voters may be undecided about some
candidates or, simply, only partial knowledge of the voter’s preference is available (e.g., knowledge is inferred indirectly
from opinions on issues). The problem already manifests itself at the semantic level: what is the meaning of vote
aggregation in the presence of incompleteness, if voting rules require complete knowledge? For this reason, Konczak
and Lang [2] introduced the notions of necessary winners and possible winners as the candidates who win in every
completion, and, respectively, at least one completion of the given partial preferences.
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This work led to a classification of the computational complexity of the necessary and possible winners for a large
variety of voting rules [3, 4, 5]. Specifically, under (efficiently computable) positional scoring rules, the necessary
winners can be computed in polynomial time via the algorithm of Xia and Conitzer [5]. The possible winners can be
computed in polynomial time under the plurality and veto rules, but their computation is NP-hard for every other pure
rule, as established in a sequence of studies [3, 4, 2, 5]. Here, pure means that the scoring vector for m candidates is
obtained from that for m− 1 candidates by inserting a new score into the vector.
In this paper, we explore the practical aspects of computing the necessary and possible winners. Specifically, we
investigate the empirical feasibility of this challenge, develop algorithmic techniques to accelerate and scale the
execution, and conduct a thorough experimental evaluation of our techniques. For the necessary winners, we show
how to accelerate the Xia and Conitzer algorithm through mechanisms of early pruning and early termination. For
the possible winners, we focus on positional scoring rules for which the problem is NP-hard. We first give a natural
polynomial-time reduction of the possible winners to Integer Linear Programming (ILP) for all positional scoring rules.
Note that ILP has been used in earlier research on the complexity of voting problems as a theoretical technique for
proving upper bounds (fixed-parameter tractability) in the parameterized complexity of the possible winners [6, 7, 8] or
in election manipulation problems involving complete preferences [9]. Here, we investigate the use of ILP solvers to
compute the possible winners in practice. Our experiments on a leading commercial ILP solver (Gurobi v8.1.1) show
that the reduction produces ILP programs that are often too large to load and too slow to solve. For this reason, we
develop several techniques to minimize or often eliminate ILP computations and, when the use of ILP is unavoidable,
to considerably reduce the size of the ILP programs.
We conduct an extensive experimental study that includes the construction of a rich benchmark of election data based
on both real and synthetic data. Our experimental findings suggest that, the worst-case intractability of the possible
winners notwithstanding, the algorithmic techniques presented here scale well and can be used to compute the possible
winners in realistic scenarios. An important contribution of our work that is of independent interest is a novel generative
model for partially ordered sets, called the Repeated Selection Model, or RSM for short. We believe that RSM may find
uses in other experimental studies in computational social choice.
2 Preliminaries and Earlier Work
Voting profiles Let C = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates and let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be a set of voters.
A (complete) voting profile is a tuple T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of total orders of C, where each Tl represents the ranking
(preference) of voter vl on the candidates in C. Formally, each Tl is a binary relation Tl on C that is irreflexive (i.e.,
ci 6Tl ci, for all i), antisymmetric (i.e., ci Tl cj implies cj 6Tl ci, for all i 6= j), transitive (i.e., ci Tl cj and
cj Tl ck imply ci Tl ck, for all i, j, k), and total (i.e., ci Tl cj or cj Tl ci holds for all i 6= j). Similarly, a partial
voting profile is a tuple P = (P1, . . . , Pn) of partial orders on C, where each Pl represents the partial preferences
of voter vl on the candidates in C; formally, each Pl is a binary relation on C that is irreflexive, antisymmetric, and
transitive (but not necessarily total). A completion of a partial voting profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a complete voting
profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) such that each Tl is a completion of the partial order Pl, that is to say, Tl is a total order that
extends Pl. Note that, in general, a partial voting profile may have exponentially many completions.
Voting rules We focus on positional scoring rules, a widely studied class of voting rules. A positional scoring rule r
on a set of m candidates is specified by a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm) of non-negative integers, called the score
values, such that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm. Suppose that T = (T1, . . . , Tn) is a total voting profile. The score s(Tl, c) of a
candidate c on Tl is the value sk where k is the position of candidate c in Tl. The score of c under the positional scoring
rule r on the total profile T is the sum
∑n
l=1 s(Tl, c). A candidate c is a winner if c’s score is greater than or equal
to the scores of all other candidates; similarly, c is a unique winner if c’s score is greater than the scores of all other
candidates. The set of all winners is denoted by W(r,T).
We consider positional scoring rules that are defined for every number m of candidates. Thus, a positional scoring
rule is an infinite sequence s1, s2, . . . , sm, . . . of scoring vectors such that each sm is a scoring vector of length m.
Alternatively, a positional scoring rule is a function r that takes as argument a pair (m, s) of positive integers with
s ≤ m and returns as value a non-negative integer r(m, s) such that r(m, 1) ≥ r(m, 2) . . . ≥ r(m,m). We assume
that the function r is computable in time polynomial in m, hence the winners can be computed in polynomial time.
Such a rule is pure if the scoring vector sm+1 of length (m+ 1) is obtained from the scoring vector sm of length m by
inserting a score in some position of sm, provided that the decreasing order of score values is maintained. We also
assume that the scores in every scoring vector are co-prime (i.e., their greatest common divisor is 1), since multiplying
all scores by the same value does not change the winners.
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As examples, the plurality rule is given by scoring vectors of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), while the veto rule is given by
scoring vectors of the form (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0). The plurality rule is the special case t = 1 of the t-approval rule, in which
the scoring vectors start with t ones and then are followed by zeros. In particular, the 2-approval rule has scoring
vectors of the form (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0). The Borda rule, also known as the Borda count, is given by scoring vectors of the
form (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Necessary and possible winners Let r be a voting rule and P a partial voting profile.
• The set NW(r,P) of the necessary winners with respect to r and P is the intersection of the sets W(r,T),
where T varies over all completions of P. Thus, a candidate c is a necessary winner with respect to r and P ,
if c is a winner in W(r,T) for every completion T of P.
• The set PW(r,P) of the possible winners with respect to r and P is the union of the sets W(r,T), where T
varies over all completions of P. Thus, a candidate c is a possible winner with respect to r and P, if c is a
winner in W(r,T) for at least one completion T of P.
The notions of necessary unique winners and possible unique winners are defined in analogous manner. The preceding
notions were introduced by Konczak and Lang [2]. Through a sequence of subsequent investigations by Xia and
Conitzer [5], Betzler and Dorn [4], and Baumeister and Rothe [3], the following classification of the complexity of the
necessary and the possible winners for all pure positional scoring rules was established.
Theorem 1. [Classification Theorem] The following statements hold.
• If r is a pure positional scoring rule, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a partial voting profile
P, returns the set NW(r,P) of necessary winners.
• If r is the plurality rule or the veto rule, there is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a partial voting profile
P, returns the set PW(r,P) of possible winners. For all other pure positional scoring rules, the following
problem is NP-complete: given a partial voting profile P and a candidate c, is c a possible winner w.r.t. r and
P?
Furthermore, the same classification holds for necessary unique winners and possible unique winners.
In the preceding theorem, the input partial voting profiles consist of arbitrary partial orders. There has been a growing
body of work concerning the complexity of the possible winners when the partial voting profiles are restricted to special
types of partial orders. The main motivation for pursuing this line of investigation is to determine whether or not the
complexity of the possible winners drops from NP-complete to polynomial time w.r.t. some scoring rules (other than
plurality and veto), if the input voting profiles consist of restricted partial orders that also arise naturally in real-life
settings. We now describe two types of restricted partial orders and state relevant results.
Definition 1. Let  be a partial order on a set C.
• We say that  is a partitioned preference if C can be partitioned into disjoint subsets A1, . . . , Aq so that the
following hold:
(a) for all i < j ≤ q, if c ∈ Ai and c′ ∈ Aj , then c  c′;
(b) for each i ≤ q, the elements in Ai are incomparable under , that is to say, a  b and b  a hold, for all
a, b ∈ Ai.
• We say that  is a partial chain if it consists of a linear order on a non-empty subset C ′ of C.
Partitioned preferences relax the notion of a total order by requiring that there is a total order between sets of
incomparable elements. As pointed out by Kenig [10], partitioned preference “were shown to be common in many real-
life datasets, and have been used for learning statistical models on full and partial rankings.” Furthermore, partitioned
preferences contain doubly-truncated ballots as a special case, where there is a complete ranking of top elements, a
complete ranking of bottom elements, and all remaining elements between the top and the bottom elements are pairwise
incomparable. This models, for example, the setting in which a voter has complete rankings of some top candidates and
of some bottom candidates, but is indifferent about the remaining candidates in the "middle". Partial chains arise in
settings where there is a large number of candidates, but a voter has knowledge of only a subset of them. For example, a
voter may have a complete ranking of movies that the voter has seen, but, of course, does not know how to compare
these movies with movies that the voter has not seen. Partial chains also model the setting of an election in which one
or more candidates enter the race late, and so a voter has a complete ranking of the original candidates but does not
know yet how to rank the new candidates who entered the race late.
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Let r be a pure positional scoring rule. We write PW-PP(r) to denote the restriction of the possible winners problem
w.r.t. r to partial voting profiles consisting of partitioned preferences. More formally, PW-PP(r) is the following
decision problem: given a partial voting profile P consisting of partitioned preferences and a candidate c, is c a possible
winner w.r.t. r and P? Similarly, we write PW-PC(r) to denote for the restriction of the possible winners problem w.r.t.
r to partial voting profiles consisting of partial chains.
Kenig [10] established a nearly complete classification of the complexity of the PW-PP(r) problem for pure positional
scoring rules. In particular, if r is the 2-approval rule, then PW-PP(r) is solvable in polynomial time. In fact, the
tractability of PW-PP(r) holds for all 2-valued rules, that it, positional scoring rules in which the scoring vectors contain
just two distinct values. If r is the Borda rule, however, then PW-PP(r) is NP-complete. In fact, results in [11, 12]
imply that the possible winners problem w.r.t. the Borda rule is NP-complete, even when restricted to input partial
voting profiles consisting of doubly truncated ballots. As regards partial chains, it was shown recently in [13] that the
classification in theorem 1 does not change for the PW-PC(r) problem. In other words, for every positional scoring
rule r other than plurality and veto, PW-PC(r) is NP-complete. In particular, PW-PC(r) is NP-complete if r is the
2-approval rule or the Borda rule.
Our experimental evaluation will focus on the plurality rule, the 2-approval rule, and the Borda rule. For this reason, we
summarize the aforementioned complexity results concerning these rules in the following table (also listing the veto
rule for completeness).
Scoring Rule PW PW-PP PW-PC NW (all kinds)
Plurality & Veto P P P P
2-approval NP-complete P NP-complete P
Borda NP-complete NP-complete NP-complete P
Table 1: Complexity of the possible winners (PW) and necessary winners (NW) problems, and their restrictions to
partitioned preferences (PW-PP) and partial chains (PW-PC) w.r.t. plurality, veto, 2-approval, and Borda rules.
3 Necessary Winners
Xia and Conitzer [5] presented a polynomial-time algorithm for determining whether a particular candidate c is a
necessary winner (NW) in an election that uses a positional scoring rule r, that is, whether c ∈ NW(r,P). We recall it
in Algorithm 1. We will then present several performance optimizations that allow us to efficiently compute the set
NW(r,P) of necessary winners.
For a partial order P ∈ P and a candidate c ∈ C, we let UPP (c) = {c′ ∈ C|c′ P c} and DOWNP (c) = {c′ ∈
C|c′ P c}. (Note that both UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) include c.) Further, for a pair of candidates c and w with c P w,
we write BLOCKP (c, w) = DOWNP (c) ∩ UPP (w) for the set of candidates ranked between c and w, including c and
w.
Note that Algorithm 1 returns true if c is a necessary winner, not only if it’s a necessary unique winner. To return true
only if c is the necessary unique winner, line 20 should be replaced by S(w) ≥ S(c).
We now present several performance optimizations that allow us to efficiently compute the set NW(r,P) of necessary
winners. Our optimizations are of two kinds. The first kind is based on reusing computation across candidates, and on
heuristically re-ordering computation. The second kind uses the structure of a given partial voting profile to optimize
the computation of UPP (c) and DOWNP (c).
Reusing and reordering computation. A straight-forward way to use Algorithm 1 to compute NW(r,P) is to
execute it m times, once for each candidate.
To eliminate redundant computation, we first compute and record the UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) of each P and c once.
We will explain how to compute UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) efficiently later in this section. Additionally, we compute and
record the best possible score of each candidate, Smax(c) = ARGMAXP∈P r(m, |UPP (c)|).
Next, we execute competitions between pairs of candidates c and w, deliberately selecting only the promising candidates
as c, and prioritizing strong opponents w. Specifically, only the candidates that have the highest Smax(c) can become
necessary winners. Further, we sort potential opponents in decreasing order of Smax(w).
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Algorithm 1 checkNW(c,P, r)
1: for each partial order P ∈ P do
2: for each candidate c′ ∈ C do
3: compute UPP (c′) and DOWNP (c′)
4: end for
5: end for
6: for each w ∈ C \ c do
7: Initialize S(w) = S(c) = 0
8: for each partial order P ∈ P do
9: if c 6P w then
10: posc = (m− |DOWNP (c)|+ 1) is the lowest possible position for c
11: posw = |UPP (w)| is the highest possible position for w
12: S(c) = S(c) + r(m, posc)
13: S(w) = S(w) + r(m, posw)
14: else if c P w then
15: slide BLOCKP (c, w) between positions |UPP (w) \ DOWNP (c)|+1 andm−|DOWNP (c) \ UPP (w)|, find
positions posc and posw that minimize r(m, posc)− r(m, posw)
16: S(c) = S(c) + r(m, posc)
17: S(w) = S(w) + r(m, posw)
18: end if
19: end for
20: if S(w) > S(c) then
21: c is not a necessary winner, return false
22: end if
23: end for
24: c is a necessary winner, return true
Computing UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) This part of the computation takes polynomial time, but the details of this
computation are left unspecified by Xia and Conitzer. In our implementation, we use BFS algorithm to compute these
sets for all candidates of a given partial profile P , maintaining intermediate results in a priority queue.
We also observe that the structure of P can be used to make this computation more efficient in some common cases.
In particular, UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) can be computed in O(m) time for linear forests (i.e., posets in which every
candidate has at most one parent and at most one child) and for partitioned preferences, where candidates are partitioned
into q sets C = A1 ∪ . . . ∪Aq , and where P provides a complete order over the sets but does not compare candidates
within a set. A common example of partitioned preferences are top-k preferences, where the first k sets are of size 1,
and the final set is of size m − k. Alternatively, UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) computation can be avoided altogether in
these cases, since scores of S(c) and S(w) that minimize S(c)− S(w) can be determined directly.
In summary, while the optimizations described in this section do not reduce the asymptotic running time of the
already polynomial NW(r,P) computation in the general case, they are useful in practice, as we will demonstrate
experimentally in Section 6.3 . As we explain in the next section, we use these and similar techniques to optimize the
performance of PW(r,P), making this computation practically feasible.
4 Possible Winners
4.1 Computing PW for Plurality and Veto
By Theorem 1, for Plurality and Veto, there are polynomial-time algorithms for telling if a given candidate is a possible
winner. In fact, Betzler and Dorn [4] gave such an algorithm for plurality by efficiently transforming the detection of
possible winners to a network flow problem with just two layers and with integral capacities along the edges of the
network. We have implemented and optimized this algorithm by, among other things, eliminating obvious winners
(candidates ranked first in over half of the partial orders in P) and obvious losers (candidates ranked first in fewer than
1/m partial orders), thus reducing the size of the network. A variant of this algorithm can be used to detect possible
winners for veto.
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4.2 Reducing PW to ILP
Again by Theorem 1, for all positional scoring rules other than plurality and veto, detecting possible winners is a
NP-complete problem. Here, we give a polynomial-time reduction of the Possible Winners problem to Integer Linear
Programming (ILP) and, in fact, to 0-1 ILP. Let r be a positional scoring rule and let s = (s1, . . . , sm) be its scoring
vector for m candidates. Consider an input to the possible winners problem consisting of a set C = {c1, . . . , cm} of
candidates, a partial voting profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn), and a distinguished candidate cw from C; the question is whether
or not cw ∈ PW(r,P).
• For each l with 1 ≤ l ≤ n and each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, introduce m binary variables xl,i1 , xl,i2 , xl,i3 , . . . , xl,im .
Intuitively, we want to have xl,ij = 1 if candidate ci has rank j in a completion Tl of Pl; otherwise, x
l,i
j = 0.
Thus, the rank of ci in Tl is equal to
∑m
p=1 p · xl,ip .
• There are two constraints to ensure the validity of a completion Tl of Pl , namely, each candidate is assigned
exactly one rank in Tl, and no two candidates are assigned the same rank in Tl.
m∑
p=1
xl,ip = 1,where 1 ≤ l ≤ n and 1 ≤ i ≤ m (1)∑
ci∈C
xl,ip = 1,where 1 ≤ l ≤ n and 1 ≤ p ≤ m. (2)
• If a candidate ci is ranked higher than a candidate cj in the partial order Pl, then ci has to also be ranked
higher in a completion Tl of Pl. This is ensured by introducing the following constraint for each such pair of
candidates and each partial order.
m∑
p=1
p
(
xl,jp − xl,ip
)
> 0. (3)
• Finally, to ensure that the distinguished candidate cw is a possible winner, we add, for each candidate ci 6= cw,
the following constraint:
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,wp . (4)
Let Σ be the preceding ILP instance. Note that Σ has O(m2n) binary variables and O(m2n) constraints.
Note also that for the case of possible unique winners, one has s(T, ci) < s(T, cw). Thus, the only change needed is to
replace the inequality in (4) by a strict one.
We want to show that a 0-1 solution to Σ exists if and only if candidate cw is a possible winner. We first prove a few
facts about the reduction and then prove the desideratum. In the following, for a set C, we let Π(C) denote the set of all
total orders on C. We also let pi : Π(C)×C −→ [1, . . . ,m] be the ranking function that returns the rank of c′ ∈ C in a
total order on C.
Lemma 1. LetC = {c1, . . . , cm} andP = {P1, . . . , Pn} a set of partial votes. For each partial vote Pl, let Tl ∈ Π(C)
be a total order that extends Pl. Consider the following
al,ip =
{
1, if pi(Pl, ci) = p
0, otherwise
(5)
The values al,ip , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ p ≤ m have the following properties:
1.
∑m
p=1 a
l,i
p = 1;
2. For p = 1, . . . ,m, we have that
∑n
i=1 a
l,i
p = 1.
Proof. These properties are a consequence of the way the ranking function pi : Π(C) × C −→ [1, . . . ,m]. For
1 ≤ i ≤ m, in a completion Tl, of the partial vote Pl, each candidate is assigned a unique rank. Therefore, for a
6
Tl ∈ Π(C), for a fixed candidate c ∈ C, there is exactly one k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that pi(Tl, c) = k. By definition of
the values al,ip , only a
l,i
k = 1; the others are 0. Thus,
∑m
p=1 a
l,i
p = 1.
For property (2), observe that pi assigns to each rank, an unique candidate. In the extension Tl, of a given vote Pl, for a
fixed k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there exists exactly one c ∈ C such that k ← [ (Tl, c). Therefore, for p = 1, . . . ,m, we have that∑i
i=1 a
l,i
p = 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose bl,ip 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ p ≤ m are non negative integers such that
1. bl,ip ∈ {0, 1}
2.
∑m
p=1 b
l,i
p = 1
3. For p = 1, . . . ,m, we have
∑n
i=1 b
l,i
p = 1
Let pi : Π(C)× C −→ [1, . . . ,m] such that pi(Tl, ci) = ki if and only if bl,iki = 1. This induces a total order on C.
Proof. Fix a Tl ∈ Π(C). Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that each ci ∈ C is mapped to exactly one p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Conditions (1) and (3) ensure that for each p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, some ci ∈ C is mapped to it. Thus, pi is a one-to-one-
correspondence.
Observe that when al,ip ’s are defined as in Equation (5),
pi(Tl, ci) =
m∑
p=1
p · al,ip .
Furthermore, for a scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm), the score of ci in Tl is
s(Tl, ci) =
m∑
p=1
sp · al,ip .
Lemma 3. Let Pl be a partial order on C and Tl be a total order on C. Suppose that we have values al,ip as defined as
in Equation (5). For all ci > cj in Pl we have the following inequalities for Tl
m∑
p=1
p(al,jp − al,ip ) > 0
if and only if Pl ↪→ Tl.
Proof. Fix a Pl. Suppose, ci  cj in Pl. Further, suppose, that in a total order Tl, the following holds
∑m
p=1p(a
l,j
p −
al,ip ) > 0. This implies that
∑m
p=1 p · al,jp −
∑m
p=1 p · al,ip > 0, i.e., pi(Tl, cj)− pi(Tl, ci) > 0, or pi(Tl, cj) > pi(Tl, ci).
This means that ci > cj in Tl. But this is also the case in Pl. Therefore, Pl ↪→ Tl.
Let Pl ↪→ Tl. By definition, for all ci  cj in Pl, we have ci > cj in Tl. Therefore, pi(Tl, cj) > pi(Tl, ci), i.e.,
pi(Tl, cj)− pi(Tl, ci) > 0. This is nothing but
∑m
p=1 p(a
l,j
p − al,ip ) > 0.
Consider a profileT = (T1, . . . , Tn) and the scoring vector s = (s1, . . . , sm). The total score of a ci ∈ C, by definition,
is
∑n
l=1 s(Tl, ci) which is
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · al,ip
The above along with the definition of a possible winner makes the following fact quite obvious.
Lemma 4. Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be a profile as above and let cw be a fixed candidate. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
1. cw is a winner in T using the scoring rule s = (s1, . . . , sm).
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2. For every candidate ci 6= cw we have that,
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · al,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · al,wp
Now we will prove the main theorem.
Theorem 2. The following statements are equivalent.
1. Candidate cw is a possible winner w.r.t. the rule r and the partial profile P.
2. The system Σ has a 0-1 solution.
Proof. (1 =⇒ 2) Assume that a partial order P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ↪→ T = {T1, . . . , Tn} such that cw is a possible
winner. Set
al,ip =
{
1, if pi(Tl, ci) = p
0, otherwise
(6)
We claim that the assignment xl,ip 7→ al,ip satisfy all the equations of the system Σ.
Indeed, from Lemma 1, we know that this satisfies the following constraints
1.
∑m
p=1 a
l,i
p = 1
2. For p = 1, . . . ,m, we have
∑n
i=1 a
l,i
p = 1
Since P ↪→ T, by definition, Pl ↪→ Tl. By Lemma 3, the constraints
∑m
p=1p(x
l,j
p − xl,ip ) > 0 are satisfied. Since cw is
a possible winner in P , by Lemma 4, the constraints
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,wp
are satisfied.
(2 =⇒ 1)Assume that the system Σ has the integer solution al,ip (1 ≤ l ≤ n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ p ≤ m). The each al,ip
is either 0 or 1 by the first group of constraints. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, the constraints
For each candidate ci ∈ C
m∑
p=1
xl,ip = 1 (7)
For each position p = 1, . . . ,m
m∑
i=1
xl,ip = 1 (8)
ensure that each vote induces a total order >l on C. Furthermore, the total order Tl extends Pl because of the constraints∑m
p=1 p(a
l,j
p − al,ip ) > 0. Finally, since the constraints
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
sp · xl,wp
are satisfied, Lemma 4 implies that cw is a possible winner.
We illustrate the preceding result in the following concrete cases.
Borda rule The scoring vector for Borda is (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0). Thus, the constraints in (4) become
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
(m− p) · xl,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
m∑
p=1
(m− p) · xl,wp . (9)
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t-approval The scoring vector for t-approval assigns a score of 1 to each of the first t ranked candidates, and 0 to the
remaining ones. Thus, the constraints in (4) become
n∑
l=1
t∑
p=1
xl,ip ≤
n∑
l=1
t∑
p=1
xl,wp . (10)
4.3 Checking a Possible Winner
Determining whether or not cw ∈ PW(r,P) using our methodology involves the following two main steps.
1. Construct the ILP model. Constraints (1) and (2) depend only on m and n, whereas, constraints (3) and (4)
depend additionally on cw and on the partial profile.
2. Solve the ILP model.
Fix the values for m and n. One creates a partial model for the corresponding (m,n) with only constraints (1) and (2).
This is called pre-processing. To save time, pre-processed models can be reused when the candidate cw, the partial
profile P, or both change. To solve a specific problem, one loads the appropriate pre-processed model, and updates it
by adding constraints (3) and (4) before solving it.
4.4 Three-phase Computation of the Set of Possible Winners
A straight-forward way to compute the set of possible winners PW(r,P) is to execute the computation described in
Section 4.3 above m times, once for each candidate. We now describe a more efficient method that uses pruning and
early termination techniques, and heuristics to quickly identify clear possible winners. This method involves three
phases:
1. Use NW(r,P) to identify a subset of possible winners C1pw, and to prune clear non-winners C
1
lsr. Pass the
remaining C1 = C \ (C1pw ∪ C1lsr) to the next phase.
2. Use a heuristic to construct a completion in which c ∈ C1 is a winner. Add all candidates for which such a
completion is found to C2pw, and pass the remaining C
2 = C1 \ C2pw to the next phase.
3. Invoke the subroutine described in Section 4.3 to check a possible winner for each c ∈ C2 using an ILP solver.
Add all identified possible winners to C3pw.
The final set of possible winners is C1pw ∪ C2pw ∪ C3pw.
Phase 1: Using the Necessary Winner algorithm. Let us denote by Stotal(r,m) the sum of scores of all candidates
in some total voting profile. We will execute NW(r,P) to compute the set of necessary winners, which are also possible
winners. Recall that as part of the NW(r,P) computation, we compute and record, for all c ∈ C, the best possible
score Smax(c) = ARGMAXP∈P r(m, |UPP (c)|). We can immediately identify candidates whose Smax(c) is highest
as possible winners, and add them to C1pw. Further, if Smax(c) >
1
2Stotal(r,m), then c is also a possible winner, and is
added to C1pw.
On the other hand, if Smax(c) < 1mStotal(r,m) then c is not a possible winner (by pigeonhole principle), and it can be
pruned. Further, consider the step in NW(r,P) where we execute competitions between pairs of candidates c and w.
As we compute S(w) and S(c), we may observe that S(w)− S(c) < 0. This allows us to prune w as a non-winner,
adding it to C1lsr.
Phase 2: Constructing a completion. Next, given a candidate c, we consider P = (P1, . . . , Pn) and heuristically
attempt to create a total voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) that completes P and in which c is the winner. If such a T is
found, then c is added to C2pw. To construct T, we complete each partial vote P ∈ P independently, as follows:
(1) For a given P , place c at the worst possible rank in which it achieves its best possible score. The reason for this is to
minimize the scores of the items in UPP (c) \ c.
(2) Place the remaining candidates from P into T . If multiple placements are possible, chose one that increases the
score of the currently highest-scoring candidates the least.
(3) Keep a list of candidates other than c that are the possible winners so far. In subsequent completions, place these
candidates as low as possible, minimizing their score.
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In summary, we described a reduction of the problem of checking whether a candidate c is a possible winner to
an ILP, and proposed a three-phase computation that limits the number of times the ILP solver is invoked for a set of
candidates C. We will show experimentally in Section 6.4 that the proposed techniques can be used to compute the set
of possible winners in realistic scenarios.
5 The Repeated Selection Model for Poset Generation
In this section we introduce a novel generative model for partially ordered sets, called the Repeated Selection Model, or
RSM for short. It includes earlier generative models of partial orders as special cases via a suitable choice of parameters.
We regard RSM as being a model of independent interest, and we also use it here as part of our experimental evaluation,
described in Section 6. To start, we introduce the Repeated Insertion Model (RIM) that is used for generating total
orders in Section 5.1. We then describe our novel RSM model in Section 5.2.
5.1 Preliminaries: The Repeated Insertion Model (RIM)
In this section we represent total orders using rankings, that is, ordered lists of items indexed by position. We will use
σ, τ , and so on to denote rankings. We will use σ(i) to refer to an item at position i in σ, and we will use σ−1(a) to
denote the position of element a in σ. When describing iterative algorithms, for convenience of presentation we will
denote by σi the value of σ at step i.
The Repeated Insertion Model (RIM) is a generative model that defines a probability distribution over rankings due to
Doignon et al. [14]. This distribution, denoted by RIM(σ,Π), is parameterized by a reference ranking σ and a function
Π, where Π(i, j) is the probability of inserting σ(i) at position j. Here, Π is a matrix where each row corresponds
to a valid probability distribution (i.e., the values in a row sum up to one). Algorithm 2 presents the RIM sampling
procedure. It starts with an empty ranking τ , inserts items in the order of σ, and puts item σ(i) at jth position of the
currently incomplete τ with probability Π(i, j). The algorithm terminates after m iterations, and outputs τ , a total
order over the items drawn from σ.
Algorithm 2 RIM(σ,Π)
1: Initialize an empty ranking τ = 〈〉.
2: for i = 1, . . . ,m do
3: Select a random position j ∈ [1, i] with a probability Π(i, j)
4: Insert σ(i) into τ at position j
5: end for
6: return τ
Example 1. RIM(〈a, b, c〉,Π) generates τ=〈b, c, a〉 as follows.
• Initialize an empty ranking τ 0=〈〉.
• At step 1, τ 1=〈a〉 by inserting a into τ 0 with probability Π(1, 1)=1.
• At step 2, τ 2=〈b, a〉 by inserting b into τ 1 at position 1 with probability Π(2, 1). Note that b is put before a
since b τ a.
• At step 3, τ=〈b, c, a〉 by inserting c into τ 2 at position 2 with probability Π(3, 2).
The overall probability of sampling τ is Pr(τ | 〈a, b, c〉,Π)=Π(1, 1) · Π(2, 1) · Π(3, 2). Note that this particular
sequence of steps is the only way to sample 〈b, c, a〉 from RIM(〈a, b, c〉,Π).
The Mallows model [15], MAL(σ, φ), φ ∈ (0, 1], is a special case of RIM. As a popular preference model, it defines a
distribution of rankings that is analogous to the Gaussian distribution: the ranking σ is at the center, and rankings closer
to σ have higher probabilities. Specifically, the probability of a ranking τ is given by:
Pr(τ |MAL(σ, φ)) = φ
dist(σ,τ )
1 · (1 + φ) · (1 + φ+ φ2) . . . (1 + . . .+ φm−1) (11)
Here, dist(σ, τ ) is the Kendall-tau distance between σ and τ : dist(σ, τ ) = |(a, a′) | a σ a′, a′ τ a|, that is
the number of preference pairs (a, a′) that appear in the opposite relative order in σ and τ . The expression in the
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denominator of Equation 11 is the normalization constant, which we will find convenient to denote Zφ,m. When
φ→ 0, the probability mass is concentrated around the reference ranking σ; when φ = 1, all rankings have the same
probability, that is, MAL(σ, 1) is the uniform distribution over rankings.
As was shown in [14], RIM(σ,Π) is precisely MAL(σ, φ) when Π(i, j) = φ
i−j
1+φ+...+φi−1 . That is, the Mallows model
is a special case of RIM, and so RIM can be used as an efficient sampler for Mallows.
5.2 The Repeated Selection Model (RSM)
The Repeated Selection Model (RSM) is a generative model that defines a probability distribution over posets. Intuitively,
in this model we iteratively select a random item and randomly choose whether it succeeds each of the remaining
items. More formally, an instance of this distribution, denoted RSM(σ,Π, p), is parameterized by a reference ranking
σ of length m, a selection probability function Π, where Π(i, j) is the probability of selecting the jth item among
the remaining items at step i, and a preference probability function p : {1, . . . ,m− 1} → [0, 1] that determines the
probability p(i) that the ith selected item precedes (is preferred to) each of the remaining items. We view Π as a matrix
where each row corresponds to a valid probability distribution (i.e., the values in a row sum up to one) and the i− 1
rightmost entries in the ith row are zero.
Algorithm 3 presents the RSM sampling procedure. Intuitively, in contrast to RIM (Algorithm 2) that considers
candidates one by one in the order of σ and inserts them into the output τ , RSM iteratively selects, and removes,
candidates one by one from among the remaining candidates in σ at each step. Which candidate is selected at step i is
decided randomly, based on the probability distribution in the ith row of the selection probability matrix Π (line 4 of
Algorithm 3). Furthermore, to generate posets rather than total orders, RSM uses the preference probability function
p to decide whether to add a particular preference pair to τ ; this decision is made independently for all considered
pairs (lines 6-8 of Algorithm 3). The probability that a candidate selected at step i is preferred to each of the remaining
candidates in σ is p(i).
Algorithm 3 RSM(σ, p,Π)
1: Initialize an empty poset τ = 〈〉.
2: for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 do
3: Select a random position j ∈ [1,m] with a probability Π(i, j)
4: Select candidate c = σ(j)
5: Remove c from σ, which now contains m− i candidates
6: for k = 1, . . . ,m− i do
7: Add the pair c  σ(k) to τ with probability p(i) (or leave it out with probability 1− p(i))
8: end for
9: end for
10: return the transitive closure of τ
Example 2. RSM(〈a, b, c〉,Π, p) can generate τ=〈b  a, a  c, b  c〉 as follows:
• Initialize an empty poset τ=〈〉.
• At step i = 1, select b with probability Π(1, 2) and remove it from σ, setting σ1=〈a, c〉. Then, add the pair
b  a to τ with probability p(1), and do not add the pair b  c to τ with probability 1− p(1).
• At step i = 2, select a with probability Π(2, 1) and remove it from σ, setting σ2=〈c〉. Finally, add the pair
a  c to τ with probability p(2).
• Take the transitive closure of τ and return 〈b  a, a  c, b  c〉.
The probability of sampling τ in this way is Π(1, 2) · p(1) · (1− p(1)) ·Π(2, 1) · p(2).
Note that the same τ can be generated by RSM(〈a, b, c〉,Π, p) using a different sequence of steps, thus yielding a
different probability. In our example there is one other way to derive τ : at step i = 1, add b  c to τ with probability
p(1). This happens with the probability Π(1, 2) · p(1) · p(1) ·Π(2, 1) · p(2). These are the only two possible derivations
of τ in our example. These yield the total probability
Pr(b  a  c | 〈a, b, c〉,Π, p) = Π(1, 2) · p(1) ·Π(2, 1) · p(2) .
In the general case, however, it is not clear whether this probability can be computed efficiently. In particular, the
probability of a poset may be due to all the linear extensions of the poset.
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Importantly, RSM includes several generative models of partial orders as special cases via a suitable choice of
parameters. For example, p = (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0) with k ones will generate a top-truncated partial order, whereas
p = (0, ..., 0, 1, ..., 1) with k ones will generate a partial chain over a subset of k items. Moreover, a uniform p gives
rise to the generative model referred to as Method 1 of Gehrlein [16]. Figure 1 compares these probability distributions
empirically. Finally, as we show below, the Mallows model is also a special case of RSM.
Theorem 3. For a given φ ∈ (0, 1], and for p(i) = 1 for all i, we have that RSM(σ,Π, p) is precisely MAL(σ, φ)
when Π(i, j) = φ
j−1∑m−i+1
k=1 φ
k−1 .
Proof. First, observe that because p(i) = 1 for all i, RSM(σ,Π, p) will generate total orders. Further, observe
that, although an arbitrary poset can be generated by RSM in multiple ways (as demonstrated by Example 2), there
is only one way to obtain a total order (ranking). We will show by induction on the number of candidates m in
σ that Pr(τ | RSM(σ,Π, p)) = Pr(τ | MAL(σ, φ)). Recall from Equation 11 that Pr(τ | MAL(σ, φ)) =
φdist(σ,τ )/Zφ,m, where Zφ,m is a normalization constant, and dist(σ, τ ) is the Kendall-tau distance between σ and
τ : dist(σ, τ ) = |(a, a′) | a σ a′, a′ τ a|, that is the number of preference pairs (a, a′) that appear in the opposite
relative order in σ and τ . For notational convenience, we will denote by σ−a a subranking of σ with item a removed.
Further, we will denote by Π−i,−j a projection of the matrix Π with the ith column and jth row removed.
Base case. When m = 1, both RSM and Mallows generate a single ranking with probability 1.
Inductive step. Suppose that RSM and Mallows assign the same probability to the subranking of some τ with the first
element τ (1), denoted τ1, removed, and with σ and Π adjusted accordingly:
Pr(τ−τ1 | RSM(σ−τ1 ,Π−1,−m, p)) = Pr(τ−τ1 | MAL(σ−τ1 , φ)) =
φdist(σ−τ1 ,τ−τ1 )
Zφ,m−1
(12)
Let us now consider the ranking τ of length m, and observe that dist(τ ,σ) = dist(τ−τ1 ,σ−τ1)+σ
−1(τ1)−1, where
σ−1(τ1) is the position of element τ1 in σ. Moreover, the probability to select τ1 at the first step of RSM is given by:
Π(1, σ−1(τ1)) =
φσ
−1(τ1)−1∑m
k=1 φ
k−1 (13)
Combining Equations 12 and 13, and recalling the expression for Zφ,m from Equation 11, we obtain the following
probability for τ :
Pr(τ | RSM(σ,Π, p)) = Π(1, σ−1(τ1))× Pr(τ−τ1 | RSM(σ−τ1 ,Π−1,−m, p))
=
φσ
−1(τ1)−1∑m
k=1 φ
k−1 ×
φdist(σ−τ1 ,τ−τ1 )
Zφ,m−1
=
φdist(τ ,σ)
Zφ,m
= Pr(τ | MAL(σ, φ)).
The proof by induction concludes and the theorem is proven.
6 Experimental Evaluation
All experiments were carried out on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 v3 @ 2.50GHz, with 412 GB of RAM, 20 hyper-
threaded cores running 2 threads per core, running Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS. We used Python 3.5 for our implementation,
and the solver Gurobi v8.1.1 [17] for solving the ILP instances produced by the reduction from instances of the possible
winner problem.
6.1 Experimental Datasets and Scoring Rules
Real datasets We used two real datasets in our experimental evaluation, travel and dessert.
The Google Travel Review Ratings dataset (travel) [18] consists of average ratings (each between 1 and 5) issued by
5,456 users for up to 24 travel categories in Europe. For each user, we create a set of preference pairs such that items in
each pair have different ratings (no tied pairs). Items for which a user does not provide a rating are not included into
that user’s preferences. Because preferences are derived from ratings issued by individual users, there cannot be any
cycles in the set of preference pairs corresponding to a given user.
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The dessert dataset was collected by us. It consists of user preferences over pairs of eight desserts, collected from 228
users, with up to 28 pairwise judgments per user. For each pair, users indicated their confidence in the preference using
a sliding bar. This enabled us to create several voting profiles based on this data, each corresponding to a particular
confidence threshold. With a high confidence threshold, we keep fewer pairs and obtain a sparse profile, and with
a low confidence threshold, we keep more pairs and obtain a very dense profile. Because preferences are collected
pairwise, there can be cycles. We check the set of preferences of each user and only keep those that are acyclic for the
experiments in this paper.
Synthetic datasets We use three different types of synthetic voting profiles, namely, partial chains, partitioned
preferences, and RSM Mix . We now describe the data generation process for each.
Recall from Definition 1 in Section 2 that a partial chain on a set C is a partial order on C that consists of a linear order
on a non-empty subset C ′ of C. Further, recall that a partitioned preference on a set C is a partial order on C with the
property that C is partitioned into disjoint subsets A1, . . . , Aq such that (a) every element from Ai is preferred to every
element from Aj , for i < j ≤ q; and (b) the elements in each Ai are pairwise incomparable.
We are given the set of candidates C = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cm}, and the number of voters n. To generate a partial chains
profile or a partitioned preferences profile, we start with a mixture of three Mallows models, each with φ = 0.5, with
a randomly chosen σ of size m, and covering approximately 13 of the voters, and generate a complete voting profile
T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of total orders on C. Then, to generate a partial chains profile, for each total order Ti, choose
d ∈ [0,m− 2] uniformly at random, and drop d candidates from Ti by selecting one uniformly at random from the
remaining candidates over d iterations. To generate a partitioned preferences profile, for each Ti, choose the number q
of non-empty partitions uniformly at random from the set [2,m]. To partition Ti, select q − 1 positions between 2 and
m uniformly at random without replacement, with each position corresponding to the start of a new partition. Drop the
order relations between candidates in the same partition.
To generate an RSM Mix voting profile, we use a mixture of three RSMs (as described in Section 5), each covering 13 of
the voters, with selection probability Πi,j corresponding to the Mallows model (φ = 0.5, randomly chosen σ of size
m). For each of the three RSMs, we draw the preference probability p(m) uniformly from [0, 1] for each m.
Scoring rules We evaluated the performance of our techniques for three positional scoring rules, namely, the
plurality rule, the 2-approval rule, and the Borda rule. We chose these rules for two reasons. First, they are arguably
among the most well known and extensively studied positional scoring rules. Second, the plurality rule and the
2-approval rule are prototypical examples of bounded-value rules, that is, rules in which the scores are of bounded size
(in this case, the bound on the size is 2), while the Borda rule is a prototypical example of an unbounded-value rule, that
is, the scores may grow beyond any fixed bound. Note that we also conducted experiments for the veto rule and found
out that performance followed the same trends as those for plurality. We remind the reader that the results about the
complexity of the necessary winners and the possible winners with respect to the plurality rule, the 2-approval rule, and
the Borda rule are summarized in Table 1 in Section 2.
6.2 Validation of the Repeated Selection Model (RSM)
In this section we compare the Repeated Selection Model (RSM) with Method 1 and Method 2 from Gehrlein [16].
Our first comparison is of the empirical distribution of poset density, defined as d = D
(m2 )
= 2Dm(m−1) , where m is the
number of items, and D is the total number of preference pairs in the partial voting profile P. Figure 1 presents this
comparison for 10 candidates and 50 voters. We observe that the RSM generates partial orders over a wider range of
densities than either of the two methods from Gehrlein.
Dataset NLLRSM Method 1 Method 2
Travel 9.5 10.4 10.4
Dessert (Sparse) 12.5 12.9 14.7
Dessert (Dense) 18.7 19.1 19.8
Table 2: Comparison of goodness-of-fit of RSM (Section 5), and Methods 1 and 2 from Gehrlein [16], on real-world
datasets. NLL stands for negative log-likelihood, with lower values corresponding to better fit.
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Figure 2: Running time of the necessary winners computation for 100 candidates and between 10 and 10,000 voters,
for three positional scoring rules.
We also conducted an experiment to verify that RSM is sufficiently flexible to represent real partial voting profiles.
To do this, we extended the methods of Stoyanovich et al. [19] to fit a single RSM to dessert and travel datasets, and
compared the goodness of fit to that of Method 1 and Method 2 from Gehrlein [16]. For each dataset, we compute the
negative log-likelihood using the voters for whom we know both the real subranking τ and the synthetically generated
subranking τ ′:
NLL = − 1
n
n∑
i
log(Pr(τ ′i | τ i))
Our results are summarized in Table 2, and confirm that RSM fits these real datasets more closely than other methods,
as quantified by negative log-likelihood (NLL), with lower values corresponding to better fit. Note that all methods fit
the travel dataset better as compared to the dessert dataset because the former contains partitioned preferences with
missing candidates.
6.3 Necessary Winners
In this section, we evaluate the performance of an optimized version of the polynomial-time algorithm by Xia and
Conitzer [5], as described in Section 3 for three positional scoring rules: plurality, 2-approval, and Borda.
We start with experiments that demonstrate the impact of the number of voters n and the number of candidates m on the
running time of the optimized necessary winners algorithm described in Section 3. In Figure 2, we set m = 100, vary n
between 10 and 10,000 on a logarithmic scale, and show the running time for each of the rules plurality, 2-approval,
and Borda, and for each family of synthetic datasets as a box-and-whiskers plot. We observe that the computation is
efficient: RSM Mix is the most challenging, and completes in 10 seconds or less for 10,000 voters across all scoring
rules. The running time increases linearly with n.
Next, we analyzed the speed-up achieved by the optimized necessary winners algorithm for n = 10, 000 voters, with m
ranging from 10 to 200 on a linear scale. Figure 3 shows these results in comparison to a baseline, where we reuse
computation of UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) across candidates, but do not re-order candidates in a competition, and also do
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Figure 3: Speed-up factor of the optimized necessary winners computation over the baseline, for 10,000 voters, and
between 10 and 200 candidates, for three positional scoring rules. Performance is improved by a factor of 10-20 in
most cases, and is highest for partial chains and partitioned preferences.
not optimize the computation of UPP (c) and DOWNP (c) based on the structure of P. We observe that the optimized
implementation outperforms the baseline by a factor of 10-20 in most cases. Overall, speed-up improves with increasing
number of candidates, and partial chains and partitioned preferences datasets show the highest speed-up. We see
significant variability in Figure 3a, because some of the instances had necessary winners and others did not.
We also analyzed the running time and observed that this computation is efficient: RSM Mix completes in under 40
seconds for m = 200 for plurality and 2-approval, and for all except one case of Borda, where it takes 60 seconds. For
partitioned preferences and partial chains, the computation completes in under 8.5 seconds and 2 seconds, respectively,
pointing to the effectiveness of the optimizations that use the structure of P .
Finally, the running times were interactive on real datasets: 0.006 seconds for all scoring rules on dessert, and 0.28
seconds on travel. We achieved a factor of 2-2.5 speed-up over the baseline version for dessert, and a factor of 5-6.7
speed-up for travel. Speed-up was most significant for Borda, with running time decreasing from 1.87 seconds to 0.28
seconds.
6.4 Possible Winners
In this section, we evaluate the performance of appropriate methods for the computation of possible winners (PW)
under plurality, 2-approval, and Borda.
Plurality To compute PW under plurality, we implemented an optimized version of the polynomial-time algorithm
by Betzler and Dorn [4], as described in Section 4.1. Figure 4 shows the running time of our implementation. In
Figure 4(a), we set m = 25 and vary n between 10 and 10,000 on a logarithmic scale, while in Figure 4(b) we set
n = 10, 000 and vary m between 5 and 25 on a linear scale. We observe that this algorithm is efficient: most instances
complete in less than 0.5 second, with the exception of a single instance that takes just over 1 second. The running
time is higher when there are more possible winners. For this reason, computation is fastest on partitioned preferences
datasets, and slowest on partial chains datasets. (Note that we set m lower for PW experiments than for NW, where m
went up to 200, to have the same experimental setting for plurality as for 2-approval and Borda, presented later in this
section. A high value of m is infeasible for the latter rules because of the intrinsic complexity of the problem.)
2-approval and Borda using three-phase computation As discussed in Section 2, computing PW under the Borda
rule is NP-complete both for voting profiles consisting of partial chains and for voting profiles consisting of partitioned
preferences. Furthermore, computing PW under 2-approval is NP-complete for voting profiles consisting of partial
chains, but is polynomial-time solvable for voting profiles consisting of partitioned preferences. In view of the
intractability implied by the aforementioned NP-complete cases, we use the three-phase method described in Section 4.4
that may invoke the ILP solver for difficult cases. We evaluate the performance of this method here, demonstrating the
impact of the number of voters n and the number of candidates m on the running time of PW. (Note that we include
2-approval for partitioned preferences into the comparison, for consistency of presentation.) We fix m at 25 and vary n
between 10 and 10,000 on a logarithmic scale, and then fix n at 10,000 and vary m between 5 and 25 on the linear
scale. Even with these modest values of m, the ILP solver can take a very long time. Thus, to make our experimental
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Figure 4: Running time of the computation of the set of possible winners on plurality, using an optimized implemen-
tation of the algorithm from Betzler and Dorn [4]. Most instances complete in less than 0.5 seconds. Running times are
higher when there are more possible winners. For this reason, computation is fastest on partitioned preferences, and
slowest on partial chains.
evaluation manageable, we set an end-to-end cut-off of 2,000 seconds per instance. In what follows, we report the
running times of the instances that completed within the cut-off, and additionally report the percentage of completed
instances.
Figures 5(a) and 6(a) show the running time as a function of the number of voters for 2-approval and Borda, respectively.
The running time increases linearly with the number of voters. Interestingly, partial chains datasets take as long or
longer to process as RSM Mix datasets. This is because Phase 1 of the three-phase computation is more effective for
RSM Mix, with fewer candidates passed on to Phase 2. Phases 1 and 2 are effective in pruning non-winners and in
identifying clear possible winners. Of the 75 instances we executed for this experiment for each scoring rule, only 13
(17%) needed to execute Phase 3 (i.e., invoke the ILP solver) for 2-approval, and only 9 (12%) — for Borda, with at
most 3 candidates to check. Of the 9 instances that reached Phase 3 for Borda, 6 timed out at 2,000 sec. No other
instances timed out in this experiment. Instances reaching Phase 3 are responsible for the high variability in the running
times. For 2-approval, all instances that reached Phase 3 computed in under 148 seconds (median 8.46 seconds, mean
30.69 seconds, stdev 48.72 seconds). For Borda, for the three instances that executed Phase 3 and did not timeout, the
running times were 6 sec, 15 sec, and 381 sec. In contrast, all remaining instances — those that did not execute Phase 3
— computed in under 53 sec (median 2.44 sec, mean 9.50 sec, stdev 15.14 sec).
Figures 5(b) and 6(b) show the running times as a function of the number of candidates under 2-approval and Borda.
We make similar observations here as in our discussion of Figures 5(a) and 6(a), noting that only 9 instances instances
reached Phase 3 for 2-approval, and only 4 reached Phase 3 for Borda. These instances, all RSM Mix, took longer to
run, and contributed the most to running time variability.
2-approval on partitioned preferences: three-phase computation vs. network flow For the 2-approval rule on
voting profiles consisting of partitioned preferences, we also implemented Kenig’s [10] polynomial-time algorithm,
which is based on network-flow, and we compared its performance to that of three-phase computation. Figure 5(c)
shows the running times as a function of the number of partitions for instances containing 25 candidates and 10,000
voters. None of the 30 instances needed ILP (Phase 3) while using the three-phase computation. Overall, our three-phase
approach is both more general in terms of the datasets it handles, and it outperforms the polynomial-time network-flow
algorithm for partitioned preferences.
Drilling down on the phases of the three-phase computation Next, we measured the effectiveness of the first two
phases of the three-phase computation, which run in polynomial time in the number of candidates. To do so, we
calculate the proportion of profiles for which the three-phase computation terminates after the first two phases, under
the Borda scoring rule. We created 10,000 profiles consisting of 100 voters and 10 candidates using a mixture of three
RSMs, as described in Section 6.1.
Figure 7 presents the density distribution of the resulting posets (as in Figure 1), and highlights the instances for which
PW computation terminated after two phases in purple, and those for which all three phases were necessary in yellow.
In summary, PW terminated after two phases for 91.62% of the instances. Phase 3 was needed primarily when the φ
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Figure 5: Running time of the three-phase computation of the set of possible winners on 2-approval scoring rule. (a)
None of the 75 instances timed out at 2,000 sec. These were among only 13 instances (9 RSM Mix and 4 partial chain)
that needed to execute the ILP solver in Phase 3. (b) None of the 75 instances timed out at 2,000 sec. These were
among only 9 instances (all RSM Mix) that needed to execute the ILP solver in Phase 3. (c) Comparison of three-phase
computation with polynomial-time algorithm (based on flow network and theoretical results in [10]) by varying the
number of partitions in each instance.
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Figure 6: Running time of the three-phase computation of the set of possible winners on Borda scoring rule. (a) 6 (all
RSM Mix) out of 75 instances (8.0%) timed out at 2,000 sec. These were among only 9 instances (all RSM Mix) that
needed to execute the ILP solver in Phase 3. (b) 4 (all RSM Mix) out of 75 instances (5.3%) that needed to execute the
ILP solver, timed out at 2,000 sec.
parameter was low and the average density was medium, or when the φ parameter as well as the average density were
both high. Profiles with low average density always terminated after the second phase.
We also compared the average running time of the first two phases of the PW algorithm using RSM profiles with profiles
generated using Gehrlein’s methods. In this experiment, we generated 10,000 profiles using a mixture of 3 RSM models,
with m = 10 candidates and n = 100 voters, and used the Borda scoring rule. RSM profiles generally take more time
across different values of φ (Figure 8(a)) and across different poset densities (Figure 8(b)) as RSM is more generalized
(Figure 1). This finding once again underscores that RSM is able to generate interesting posets, which may be more
challenging to process than those generated with alternative methods.
PW on real datasets Finally, we computed PW for the real datasets dessert and travel using three-phase computation,
and found multiple possible winners for all scoring rules. In all cases, winners were determined in Phases 1 and 2 of the
computation, and the ILP is never invoked. All executions took under 23 seconds.
7 Concluding Remarks
The contributions made in this paper can be summarized as follows.
17
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
mean probability
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
de
ns
ity
No ILP
ILP
Figure 7: 91.62% of 10,000 RSM profiles, with 10 candidates and 100 voters, found the entire set of possible winners
under the Borda scoring rule after the first two phases of pruning without the need of using ILP.
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Figure 8: Average running times of the first two phases of three-phase computation, for 10,000 RSM profiles, with 10
candidates and 100 voters, for the Borda scoring rule. Method 1 and Method 2 are from Gehrlein [16]. RSM generates
challenging profiles for the computation of PW.
• We introduced new methods for generating partial orders that are of interest in their own right, most notably,
the Repeated Selection Model.
• Furthermore, we produced a rich set of datasets that can serve as benchmarks in other experiments concerning
incomplete preferences in computational social choice.
• We presented a number of algorithmic techniques for computing the necessary winners and the possible
winners for positional scoring rules in the presence of incomplete preferences. We demonstrated that our
techniques scale well in a variety of settings, including settings in which computing the possible winners is an
NP-hard problem.
The algorithmic techniques and the data generation methods presented here may find applications in other frameworks,
including the framework introduced in [20] and studied further in [7], which aims to bring together computational
social choice and databases by supporting queries about winners in elections together with relational context about
candidates, voters, and candidates’ positions on issues.
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